Investing and Gambling

financial-statements

I bought my first stock when I was in college. $1,000 invested in Novell. In those pre-Internet days, I watched the Nightly Business Report every evening to see how it performed. The stock rose, I took a healthy profit, and I thought I was a genius – until I bought my second stock.

Since then I’ve spent over a decade interviewing countless investment managers, hedge funds, private equity shops who spend all of their time researching securities and deals. Every single idea they espouse sounds compelling at the time. Just like I felt about Novell. But the good managers admit they are wrong almost as often as they are right. The trick is to make more money when you are right than when you are wrong.

The stock market is an auction. Whenever you buy a stock, there is someone on the other side of the trade who is just as convinced it is time to sell.

25 years ago the person on the other side of the trade was probably an individual, a retail investor. Now greater than 90% of trades are by institutions, firms which spend all of their time researching securities, who have dozens of analysts and access to reams of research. They build elaborate spreadsheets forecasting earnings and speak frequently with company management, customers and suppliers.

When I buy a stock the underlying assumption is I have an informational edge, that I know something about the company the institution on the other side of the trade doesn’t know. In fact, when I buy a stock I’m saying I know something the majority of market participants don’t know, which is why the stock is undervalued.

The fact is I don’t know more than the person on the other side of the trade. I have no informational edge when it comes to individual securities, and I would argue very few investors do.

I admit my ignorance up front so when there is a company that interests me, I buy stock options. I purchase just enough options that if they expire worthless, I’m willing to accept the 100% loss. But if I win, I win big.

When you invest in individual stocks and have no informational edge, it is no different than gambling. Consequently, you might as well structure the investment just like a bet. Double or nothing. That is the beauty of stock options.

If You Can’t Explain It to Somone, Then Don’t Invest

Jumping Snowmobile

Last week here in Idaho, Federal regulators charged our local version of Bernie Madoff, a man named Daren Palmer, with a “brazen Ponzi scheme”. Palmer allegedly promised investors 20%+ returns by investing in stock index futures. Instead, Palmer only invested $4.5 million and used the remaining $40 million to pay profits to early investors, build a $12 million home, pay off credit cards and buy snow mobiles. I know of people who lost the bulk of their net worth investing with Palmer, who apparently was a church going, family man.

About a decade ago, I met with a university client to discuss hedge funds. One board member, an older gentleman much wiser than me, said he would never recommend the university invest in hedge funds. When I asked why, he said he had a simple rule of thumb when it came to investing. “If I can’t explain it to someone, then I don’t invest.”

Many a fortune would have been saved if investors would follow that simple rule.

Several weeks ago, a doctor friend invited me to listen to a CEO who was doing a round of fund raising for an early stage venture. This doctor had invested $50,000 several years ago in this enterprise and wasn’t sure if he should invest more.

We met in the home of a different doctor to listen to the pitch. The scene can only be described as a Tupperware party for doctors, complete with chocolate brownies for refreshments. I was one of the only non-MDs in the room.

The CEO gave a PowerPoint presentation highlighting all of the wonderful things his company had been doing and would be doing, including making a lot more money than they were making now. I could see the doctors and their spouses get that glazed look one gets when they start imagining future riches.

I was one of the only attendees who asked tactful, but hard-nosed questions, such as if this is such a great company why is he raising money in the living room of some doctor in Idaho. The presentation ended with the distribution of USB drives containing key documents, such as the offering memorandum.

I’m convinced I was one of the few that read through the documents, and probably one of the few that didn’t invest. The supporting documents were alarming. The CEO needed to raise money in Idaho because venture capitalists wouldn’t go near this company. The doctors were keeping it afloat.

In this case, this wasn’t a Ponzi scheme because the sorry state of the company was fully disclosed. But for the doctors that invested it might as well have been a Ponzi scheme because they were violating that university board member’s simple rule of thumb. “If you can’t explain it to someone, then don’t invest.”

P.S.
Even if you can explain an investment to someone, there are some additional precautions. If the investment has the word hedge, leverage, shorting, arbitrage, derivatives, illiquid or any other fascinating jargon of high finance, then make sure the fund (and one should only make such an investment through a fund) is audited by a top-tier independent accounting firm and all valuations are verified by a top-tier independent administrator.